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Philosophical Methodology in Will Kymlicka's 
Multicultural Citizenship 
 
Evan Clarke, University of Guelph 
Department of Philosophy 
 
 
We must begin the inquiry by grasping (a) what is said by those who assert that it is; (b) what is said by 
those who deny that it is; and (c) the common opinion on these matters"  
Aristotle – The Physics (Book IV) 
 
 
Introduction 
Will Kymlicka's Multicultural Citizenship, from 1995, represents the opening salvo in an 
extensive debate regarding the legitimacy of collective rights for minority cultures.  Against 
liberals who maintain that such rights run counter to liberalism, Kymlicka argues that group-
differentiated rights are a valid extension of basic liberal values.  The bulk of his book, then, is 
taken up with the task of demonstrating that liberalism is already heavily invested in the group; 
that despite its exaggerated fidelity to the autonomous individual, liberalism recognizes the 
centrality of group identification in social and political life.  Insofar as he can make this 
recognition explicit, Kymlicka can clear away whatever obstacles prevent us from affirming the 
legitimacy, and indeed the necessity, of group-differentiated rights for minority cultures.   
 The present essay has its point of departure in the observation that, despite this clarity of 
purpose, Kymlicka's characterization of contemporary liberalism often feels somewhat 
equivocal.  On the one hand, Kymlicka wants to persuade the reader that the rights of minority 
cultures are widely under-acknowledged; on the other hand, he presents an informed survey of 
countries that have both recognized and affirmed these rights.  As a result, the magnitude of 
Kymlicka's problematic can seem to oscillate:  at times, the problem of minority rights appears 
as a hugely symptomatic crisis; at others, it seems to represent simply an incomplete project.  
This tension, I will argue, speaks to a two-tiered argumentative structure, one that sees Kymlicka 
dealing with the question of minority cultures at the level of political practice and political 
theory.  At the level of political practice, there exist numerous mechanisms for addressing the 
claims of minority cultures.  At the level of political theory, however, the legitimacy of group-
specific treatment remains largely under-theorized.  The liberal tradition, with its steadfast 
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commitment to certain core values⎯notably, the primacy of the individual⎯has been simply 
unwilling to consider rights and freedoms in terms of groups.   
According to Kymlicka, liberal theory is critically out-of-step with existing political 
processes.  Thus, his project will consist in an attempt to harmonize these spheres; to bring 
liberal theory in line with the practical wisdom of liberal-democracies.  Perhaps more 
interestingly, Kymlicka will also attempt to bring liberal theory in line with its own basic 
assumptions:  he will argue that liberal theory has consistently, but unconsciously, assumed 
group-identification as the necessary context of individual rights.  By making this assumption 
explicit, Kymlicka can show that liberalism, on its own terms, is obligated to affirm the rights of 
all cultural, ethnic and national sub-units that reside within its territorial boundaries. 
What these two strategies mutually reflect, I will argue, is a certain basic philosophic 
methodology—one that consists in extracting the implied consensus at work within, and across, 
various domains of liberalism.  However heterogeneous its various theoretical and practical 
articulations, Kymlicka wants to show that liberalism has consistently assumed certain key 
principles.  The task of the present essay will be an exploration of this methodology, with 
attention to both its particular mechanics, as well as the philosophical significance that it 
assumes over the course of Multicultural Citizenship. 
 
Overview 
In Section I of my paper, I examine Kymlicka's reading of liberal theory.  I highlight several 
instances in which he attempts to bring liberal theory in line with its key assumptions, raising 
liberalism's awareness of the centrality of group-identification to the surface.  In Section II.I, I 
turn to Kymlicka's examination of the practical sphere, isolating three instances in which he 
attempts to correct liberalism's drift towards abstract individualism with an illustration of the 
practical importance of group-identification.  In Section II.II, I examine Kymlicka's response to 
the possibility that group-differentiated rights might license illiberal practices within individual 
minority groups.  In Section III, briefly, I note some surprising continuities between Kymlicka's 
philosophic methodology and the philosophic methodology at work within continental 
philosophy.  I conclude by arguing that the results gathered over the course of paper point in the 
direction of a consistent philosophic methodology, and that by making this methodology explicit, 
we will be better situated to appreciate the objectives of Multicultural Citizenship. 
 3
I  Aligning Theory with Theory 
As will have become clear from these introductory remarks, my overall argument rests fairly 
heavily on the notion that Kymlicka holds what I will call, somewhat provisionally, an 
essentialist view of liberalism.  Indeed, the picture that I have drawn of Kymlicka's philosophic 
methodology⎯as a determination of the implicit horizon of liberal discourse⎯can only really 
have meaning given the assumption of a more-or-less stable horizon.  This being the case, it is no 
doubt incumbent upon me to first establish that Kymlicka does in fact subscribe to such a view; 
that there is, for Kymlicka, some basic liberal core⎯one that is in some way independent of the 
fluctuations and re-interpretations to which political ideologies are subject.  
That Kymlicka holds such a view is nowhere more clear than in his arguments regarding 
the historical mutations that liberalism has undergone, specifically those which have resulted in a 
reduced recognition of minority cultures.  As we will see in the following examples, Kymlicka 
does not regard these mutations as enduring contributions to liberal discourse.  Rather, he views 
them as deviations from liberalism formulated in response to particular political exigencies.  
Beyond simply spotlighting their pragmatic origins and attempting to undermine them in this 
way, however, Kymlicka will also attempt to show that these mutations are self-undermining; 
that what they demonstrate, in effect, is the legitimacy of minority cultures.  On my reading, it is 
in precisely this move, in the extraction of the implied consensus underlying even apparent 
departures from consensus, that the originality and force of Kymlicka's presentation emerges.   
 In Chapter 4 of Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka reconstructs the history of liberal 
attitudes towards minority cultures, attempting to isolate those moments at which liberalism 
turned away from minority rights and toward abstract universalism.  One such turning-point, he 
tells us, came by way of Brown vs. Board of Education (1954), a U.S. Supreme Court case which 
considered the system of "separate but equal" schools for black and white children, and which 
resulted in the abolition of racial segregation within the American educational system.  This case 
was hugely influential, resulting in the widely held view that minority groups are best 
accommodated by abolishing group-specific treatment.  Following the U.S. example, the 
Canadian Supreme Court invoked the logic of Brown vs. Board of Education in order to deny 
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special status to Native Canadians.  This principle has also been brought to bear on the rights of 
Native Americans, Hawaiians, and the rights of national minorities under international law.1   
 For Kymlicka, the widespread application of Brown vs. Board of Education represents a 
grave over-generalization.  Politicians and liberal theorists have assumed that the measures 
appropriate to African-Americans are appropriate to all minorities whatsoever, and have thus 
rendered a disservice to groups such as Native Americans, whose special status requires 
institutional recognition.  As I have indicated, however, Kymlicka does not wish to weaken the 
principle of across-the-board equality by simply presenting evidence of the historical injustice 
that has developed out of it.  Rather, he wants to show that the principle drawn out of Brown vs. 
Board of Education can be used to support its apparent opposite: the legitimacy of group-
differentiated rights (69). 
In order to unravel this seeming contradiction, it is necessary to invoke Kymlicka's 
distinction between ethnic groups and national minorities (10). Brown vs. Board of Education, 
according to Kymlicka, applies solely to ethnic groups—that is, to groups that are distinguished 
from the mainstream culture by virtue of a shared ethnicity, but who nevertheless desire 
integration within the majority culture.  It does not, however, apply to national minorities⎯to 
groups that exist within the territorial framework of a particular state, but who do not wish to 
forego their distinct status within that state.  By insisting on this distinction we bring to light an 
important fact regarding Brown vs. Board of Education, namely, that it assumes the desire for 
cultural and institutional integration.  Indeed, while it has been interpreted as a measure that 
simply abolishes group identification, Brown vs. Board of Education is more accurately regarded 
as a measure that enforces group-identification.  Precisely insofar as it dismantles the social and 
institutional barriers to integration, this ruling paves the way for identification with the majority 
culture. 
Ultimately, then, the significance of Brown vs. Board of Education does not consist in its 
particular application within a particular historical context, but in the fact that it implicitly 
acknowledges the centrality of group-identification.  Almost in spite of itself, this ruling affirms 
group membership as the necessary precondition for social equality.  Given this affirmation, 
                                                 
1 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship, Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 59.  
Subsequent references to this work will be given in parentheses. 
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Kymlicka argues, there is no reason that Brown vs. Board of Education cannot be invoked in 
support of group-specific rights for minority cultures.  
 In Chapter 5, Kymlicka moves from a discussion of legal principles to theoretical 
principles.  Here he assesses the view, put forward by Jeremy Waldron, that cultural membership 
is not essential and should not therefore be subject to political protection.  As we have seen 
already, Kymlicka does not seek to dismiss this view of liberalism on historical grounds, or on 
the basis of logical inconsistency.  Rather, he attempts to show that it is under-girded by its 
effective antithesis, namely, the irreducibility of cultural membership (86).  Seizing on Waldron's 
image of the "cosmopolitan life"2⎯i.e. a life that is free of cultural attachment⎯Kymlicka 
makes the case that such a trans-cultural existence is only possible given the underlying support 
of a particular culture, specifically, a diverse, poly-ethnic society such as the United States (81).  
He suggests that it is only insofar as one exists within a society that encourages the proliferation 
of cultural identities that one can claim independence from any culture whatsoever.  In this 
sense, it appears that Waldron's argument requires precisely what it attempts to exclude, namely, 
a secure cultural foundation.  He is unable to illustrate the erosion of cultural attachment without 
quietly presupposing an even more fundamental, almost unspoken, cultural bond. 
 In light of the preceding examples, it is clear that, for Kymlicka, any apparent departure 
from minority rights recognition can be referenced back to an explicit acknowledgment of its 
legitimacy; that the embrace of abstract universalism is always made possible by a prior 
acknowledgment of group membership.  That liberal theorists have traditionally failed to 
recognize this speaks as much to a broad interpretation of equality⎯whereby it becomes 
synonymous with identity⎯as to the primacy of group-identification:  precisely because it is so 
deeply embedded in the fabric of our lives, we require a radical, almost Kantian, shift in 
perspective in order to bring group-identification into focus as an object of study.   
 
II.I  Aligning Theory with Practice 
If the examples considered thus far have demonstrated that modern liberalism is unable to 
confront the question of group-differentiated rights, the following examples reinforce precisely 
the opposite point.  Here, we learn that liberalism is already confronting the question of group-
                                                 
2 Waldron, Jeremy. 'Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative,' University of Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform, 25/3: 751-93. 
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differentiated rights, and that it is simply liberal theory that has failed to grasp the centrality of 
group-identification.  In what follows, I will examine three instances in which Kymlicka locates 
remedies for this failure in the realm of political practice. 
 The first of these examples is drawn from Chapter 7 of Multicultural Citizenship, and 
concerns the issue of group representation.  For certain strands of liberalism, group 
representation has a touch of the heretical.  Indeed, the idea that political representation should 
be determined according to group membership threatens one of liberalism's most cherished 
principles:  the notion that the individual is the basic unit of the liberal democratic state.  As 
Kymlicka notes, however, group representation has "important continuities with existing 
practices of representation in liberal democracies" (144).  For instance, there have been 
numerous occasions in which voting districts in the United States and Canada have been drawn 
"so as to correspond with 'communities of interest'" (135).  In this way, politicians have sought to 
ensure that the majority does not everywhere outnumber minority groups, and that the latter are 
able to elect representatives from within their own community.  The prevalence of such 
practices, for Kymlicka, militates against the abstract individualism of liberal theory, 
demonstrating that politics in the United States has implicitly acknowledged the relevance of 
group-membership in matters of political representation (136).  Hence, there is no substantial 
reason that the "underlying logic" of practices such as the re-drawing of electoral boundaries 
cannot be used to defend political representation for groups that are not similarly concentrated 
within a particular territory (137). 
In Chapter 5 of Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka highlights another instance in which 
liberalism's commitment to abstract principles has blinded it to the reality of liberal governance, 
pointing to the widespread tendency to consider citizenship as if were simply a universal 
category; as if it were simply equivalent to 'person' (125). Against this unthinking 
universalization, Kymlicka asks that we consider citizenship in terms of its specific properties, in 
terms of the way that it actually works.  He suggests that 'citizen' does not simply describe an 
abstract 'person', entitled to generic set of rights and privileges, but that it describes a particular 
member of a particular group, occupying a particular geographical region.  In other words, while 
theorists have imagined that 'citizen' is a purely positive entity, Kymlicka wants to show that it is 
constituted negatively; that it is precisely by excluding non-citizens that one delineates the 
citizens of a given nation-state.  Paradoxically, our awareness of this negative constitution has 
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not simply been absent.  Indeed, if the principle of exclusion were not always somehow at work, 
it would be impossible to reproduce the liberal state as we understand it.  However, by 
embracing an ideology of the abstract subject, a subject that is unconditionally equal with 
everyone else, we have managed to distort our awareness of the very political procedures in 
which we are engaged.  Kymlicka's intervention, then, consists simply in compelling us to 
recognize the principles that we already uphold.  In this way, he avoids having to force a 
seemingly illiberal innovation into the liberal paradigm.  By removing the layers of ideological 
distortion that prevent us from acknowledging the ground-level facts of our political reality, 
Kymlicka can show that group differentiation belongs, originally and authentically, within 
liberalism. 
Our final example of this basic philosophic strategy, whereby Kymlicka corrects liberal 
theory with lessons drawn from political practice, concerns the issue of inter-group relations.  In 
our increasingly diverse societies, the potential for normative divergence between cultural groups 
is quite real.  Different groups endorse vastly different world-views, according various levels of 
priority to the notion of individual freedom.  Accordingly, liberal theorists are often quite 
anxious with regard to group-specific rights, imagining that such rights could license a particular 
group to subject its members to illiberal practices.  For Kymlicka, this anxiety is essentially 
groundless, resting on a basic misunderstanding of group-specific rights.  Liberal theorists have 
unthinkingly conflated two distinct types of collective rights, one of them liberal, the other 
potentially illiberal, and have concluded that group rights are illiberal in principle. 
 The first variety of group-specific rights fall under the heading of 'external protections.'  
External protections are intended to secure the rights of a minority group against the dominant 
society (36). The special language rights accorded to Quebec represent a prominent domestic 
example of external protections.  'Internal restrictions', on the other hand, involve the limitation 
of individual liberty in the interests of group cohesion, and as such, are clearly inimical to liberal 
values (36).  Demands made by Canadian Muslim groups for the prerogative to impose sharia 
laws on their members are, in effect, demands for internal restrictions. 
Notwithstanding the obvious difference between these two categories, liberals have 
tended to subsume both under a single heading. They have claimed that any group-specific right 
poses a threat to the freedom of the individual, as if all such rights were in the order of internal 
restrictions.  Kymlicka points to Pierre Trudeau's opposition to Quebec self-government rights, 
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defended in terms of 'the primacy of the individual,' as a symptomatic example of this confusion 
(35).  What is striking, then, is how often this distinction has been both recognized and affirmed 
in political practice.  According to Kymlicka, "public policy (quite consistently) endorses some 
external protections, while rejecting internal restrictions" (41).  And indeed, we need look no 
further than the group rights that have been accorded to Quebec, in spite of Trudeau's concerns, 
for compelling evidence to this effect. 
What Kymlicka wants to show, then, is not simply that liberal theory has missed the boat 
regarding group-specific rights, but that it has been standing on entirely the wrong pier.  
Theorists have discussed group-specific rights as if they were reducible to the question of 
individual vs. collective (47).  For this reason, they have assumed that group-specific rights 
imply some sort of collective actor, one that poses a threat to the sovereignty of the individual. 
Only at the level of practice, it seems, have liberals appreciated that group rights, such as those 
granted to Quebec, simply do not entail a power struggle between the collective and the 
individual; only here has it been understood that group-specific rights do not describe a 
collective actor, but simply delineate the collection of individuals that are entitled to a particular 
right.  It is for this reason that Kymlicka proposes to re-orient liberal theory⎯to bring it up-to-
date with the practical understanding of liberal governments.  As noted, this will entail 
something of a retreat from abstract speculation, requiring theorists to consider group-specific 
rights on a case-to-case basis; requiring them to ask whether a given right adequately defends the 
minority group against the majority, and whether, in so doing, it does not at the same time 
license internal restrictions. 
Of course, Kymlicka's approach to the problem of group-specific rights presents 
problems of its own.  Indeed, having distinguished external protections from internal restrictions, 
and having endorsed the former while rejecting the latter, Kymlicka seemingly leaves no 
mechanism for addressing the problem of illiberal minority groups.  Given that his project 
consists in formulating a plural, integrationist liberalism, this is a problem not only a practical 
level, but in terms of Kymlicka's stated intentions.  In order to bring the nature of his 
philosophical methodology more fully into view, then, it will be instructive to examine his 
approach to this second-order problem. 
 
 
 9
II.II  Confronting Illiberal Minorities 
As we have seen elsewhere in Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka tackles this problem by first 
determining its status within contemporary liberal discourse.  To this end, he examines John 
Rawls's approach to the issue of illiberal groups.  We learn that the approach found in Rawls’s 
later writings (associated with political liberalism) consists in the endorsement of individual 
autonomy as a strictly 'political' concept (159).  Rawls is willing to accept the claim made by 
some national minorities that the group is fundamentally prior to its individual members.  
However, insofar as these individuals reside within the boundaries of a liberal nation, their 
political status will be considered in terms of the basic liberal value of individual autonomy. 
 By claiming that autonomy need not be considered a constitutive feature of all 
individuals in any group whatsoever, Rawls hopes to have shifted the debate into a slightly less 
fundamental register:  from the level of basic principle to a more benign, procedural level.  What 
Kymlicka argues, however, is that Rawls has simply substituted one set of abstractions for 
another, and that by doing so, he has failed to confront the problem of internal restrictions in its 
full magnitude.  For Kymlicka, Rawls's 'political' solution does nothing to address the real 
demands made by minority groups to impose restrictions on their members.  In truth, Rawls does 
little more than reintroduce John Stuart Mill's 'comprehensive' liberalism:  the view according to 
which individuals, in a basic, metaphysical sense, simply are autonomous agents (160).  To the 
extent, then, that liberalism has failed to address the problem of illiberal groups, it is because it 
has not really been willing to admit such groups into the realm of consideration.  Liberalism has 
established a political ontology that entirely excludes groups whose practices are actually 
illiberal.  Kymlicka's own approach to this problem therefore arises as a reaction to the Rawls-
Mill consensus, eschewing their mutual commitment to abstraction and seeking solutions within 
the practical sphere.   
What Kymlicka proposes, simply, is that we should engage in dialogue with minority 
groups that wish to restrict the autonomy of their members, attempting to determine mutually 
acceptable standards of political co-habitation (171).  In this way, he forges a compromise 
between liberal ideals and the fact of potentially illiberal national minorities.  It is important to 
stress, however, that Kymlicka does not regard this compromise as a weakening of liberalism 
itself.  Indeed, as I hope will have become clear, Kymlicka holds an essentially procedural 
conception of liberalism.  In other words, he does not think that liberalism consists in an 
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unchanging set of ideals that admit of universal application. Instead, he conceives of liberalism 
as a process of negotiation, one that is motivated by a set of basic axioms, but which must always 
reckon with changing social and political circumstances.  In this sense, it is not strictly accurate 
to maintain, as I did at the outset of this paper, that Kymlicka holds an 'essentialist' view of 
liberalism.  Rather, we might simply say that liberalism, for Kymlicka, is unchanging to the 
extent that certain basic social-political phenomena remain constant.  Minority cultures, and 
specifically, national minorities, represent one such constant.  Insofar as liberal theory has lost 
sight of these groups, Kymlicka therefore attempts to reestablish them within the scope of liberal 
concern; not by simply insisting on their recognition, but by showing that liberalism, insofar as it 
attempts to engage political reality, is obliged to, and in many cases, already does acknowledge 
national minorities. 
 
III  Strange Bedfellows 
Kymlicka's book, it seems to me, is remarkable not simply for its original interpretation of 
liberalism, but for the methodology that is put to work in service of this interpretation.  His is an 
almost meta-textual reading of liberalism⎯an attempt to show what is really going on in the 
theoretical and practical domains, in spite of, and often against, the stated intentions of theorists 
and politicians.  As such, Kymlicka's philosophic methodology bears a strong resemblance to the 
methodology spelled out by Hegel in the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.  Against 
philosophy that concerns itself with "simple disagreements" between individual philosophers, 
Hegel insists that we view the "diversity of philosophical systems as the progressive unfolding of 
truth."3  In other words, the meaning of philosophy, for Hegel, does not emerge from the surface-
level narrative of philosophic discourse, but from the narrative underlying philosophy as a 
whole.  This hermeneutic is echoed by many 'continental' philosophers, who likewise seek to 
extract the counter-narratives underlying thought, text, and experience.  Thus, Martin Heidegger 
will attempt to show that our everyday orientation towards beings obscures our real 
metaphysical situation:  our precarious suspension over the void of non-being.  Michel Foucault 
will argue that the popular conception of sexuality as socially silenced is a minor symptom of the 
                                                 
3 Hegel, G.W.F. The Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V Miller, Toronto: Oxford University 
Press, 1977, p. 2. 
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"discursive explosion" that has actually characterized the modern history of Western sexuality.4  
Finally, Jacques Derrida will assert that Western philosophy, despite its superficial attachment to 
writing, is, on a more fundamental level, hostile towards writing, treating it as a merely 
derivative form of speech.5  And indeed, despite obvious differences in subject matter, 
Kymlicka's confrontation with liberalism takes a form that is very much akin to these sweeping 
philosophical projects.  To the extent that Kymlicka engages with individual doctrines or 
practices, it is never for the limited purpose of simply highlighting logical inconsistency, or 
proposing a rival theory.  Instead, it is with an eye to showing how the doctrine or practice in 
question reflects an overarching narrative.  Kymlicka is not interested in refuting Waldron or 
Rawls.  Instead, he simply shows that they move within a horizon of basic assumptions.  Insofar 
as he can make this horizon explicit⎯and in so doing, demonstrate that political philosophy 
must necessarily orient itself to this horizon⎯he can put forward a much more forceful argument 
than one which simply addresses philosophic differences.  Like Hegel's appeal to a grand 
narrative underlying philosophic discourse, or Heidegger's appeal to our radical metaphysical 
finitude, Kymlicka's argument demonstrates that there are certain doctrines that we are simply 
obliged to adopt; that to do differently would be to violate the most basic conditions of existence.  
 
Conclusion 
In many places throughout Multicultural Citizenship, Kymlicka's confrontation with the liberal 
tradition can seem so dramatic that one often feels as he is calling liberalism itself into question, 
as if he trying to prove that liberalism is somehow unable to provide solutions to minority issues, 
and must therefore be radically re-thought.  On the contrary, Kymlicka argues that liberalism 
does in fact have answers to these problems, but that it has failed to recognize them as such.  The 
answers reside, as it were, at a basic, unexamined level of liberal theory.  Somewhat 
paradoxically, these answers also reside at the level of practical instantiation:  judicious solutions 
to minority-rights issues are already in place in many liberal-democratic countries.  Where these 
answers do not ultimately reside, then, is at the crucial level of stated discourse.  The result of 
this absence, Kymlicka argues, has been much unnecessary confusion and hand wringing 
                                                 
4 Foucault, Michel. The History of Sexuality, Vol.1, trans. Robert Hurley, New York: Vintage 
Book, 1990, p. 17. 
5 Jacques Derrida. De la Grammatologie, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1967. 
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regarding group-differentiated rights.  His critical intervention consists in articulating a theory of 
group-differentiated rights within the framework of liberal theory; in rendering explicit the 
compatibility of human rights with minority rights.  For Kymlicka, the liberal tradition has 
always been aware of this compatibility.  It has merely to raise it to the level of formal 
recognition. 
